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Executive Summary:  
 
The recent media and legislative attention on growing home foreclosure rates has sparked the 
Neighborhood Development Alliance’s (NeDA’s) interest in how this has and will impact St. 
Paul’s West Side.  Unscrupulous investors have made profit off predatory lending, speculative 
purchasing, and by strategic use of skyrocketing home equity.  The cost of these practices is laid 
disproportionately on low-income areas; families need to overextend themselves to pay for 
housing, and the properties available in their price ranges have been allowed to deteriorate.  In 
neighborhoods already at risk, this trend threatens to undo the efforts of non-profit groups and the 
City of St. Paul to increase public and private investment in the neighborhoods’ housing stock.  
 
In particular, NeDA had concerns if equity stripping was taking place in their targeted investment 
program area.  Of particular interest was whether the owners of single-family homes and 
duplexes were converting the increased equity of rental properties to cash, without making 
necessary repairs to maintain the quality of their investment. Disinvestment can lead to decay and 
have a negative impact on already struggling neighborhoods.  To try and understand what was 
happening in this neighborhood, we examined evidence of investment and disinvestment in 
several census blocks within NeDA’s target area on St. Paul’s West Side.  We then compared 
those blocks with census blocks of a similar demographic and structural makeup, lying outside 
NeDA’s target area.    
 
While a variety of data limitations and the small scale of the project make definitive conclusions 
impossible, there are points worth noting.  
 
• There have been more foreclosures in NeDA’s target area than the corresponding non-
targeted area.  
• Home equity loans, in general, occurred in similar frequencies in both areas. 
• While total investment (measured by permit value) was greater in the non-targeted area, a 
greater proportion of wealth obtained from home equity loans went toward permits in the 
target area.  (Higher property values in the non-targeted region made for larger loan 
amounts). 
• Sale rates of property are similar for both  areas 
  
While the foreclosure rates in NeDA’s target area is disturbing, the not-for-profit developer’s 
investment may have had a positive effect: the reinvestment of equity loans by homeowners in 
their property was proportionally greater in NeDA’s target area. The health of the neighborhood 
(as measured by the number of complaints and income measures) is not yet comparable to the 
nearby region it was compared to, but improvement is occurring.  
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Background:  
 
At risk or declining neighborhoods are often considered to be characterized by disinvestment – a 
state where owners and tenants fail to make improvements, sometimes even failing to make 
needed repairs to essential components like plumbing or heating systems.  This state is a self-
feeding cycle, driven by a fear that declining property values or slow home sales will prevent 
owners from recouping the cost of repairs when they sell the home.  Perhaps more importantly, 
the impression that the neighborhood is becoming undesirable can compound fears that further 
investment will be wasted as property values decrease or fail to rise. Indicators of an undesirable 
neighborhood that residents monitor are real (or perceived) increase in crime rates, increased 
vandalism, property decay, litter accumulation, and others. (Taylor, 1999) 
 
Economic development efforts attempt to interrupt this cycle; whether through job creation, 
business attraction, or improvement of the housing stock, the goal is to make the neighborhood 
more desirable both to outsiders and for the benefit of residents.  Through loans and grants for 
home rehabilitation for low-income residents, as well as development projects constructing new 
and rehabilitating old housing, NeDA’s efforts focus on improving the housing stock of the area.  
In many respects, this strategy is an indirect approach to economic development – new 
development projects are useful to the community mostly as a catalyst for future, private 
investment.  No non-profit organization has the funds available to single-handedly remake a 
neighborhood, so most (NeDA included) strategically choose projects that are needed, but are 
also visible and symbolic as evidence of investment.  The expectation is that those improvements 
will both inspire changes in current residents’ behaviors toward home improvements and 
maintenance and attract new, often higher-income residents to the area.  Increasing the mix of 
low, moderate and middle income families within a neighborhood can help it weather economic 
downturns.  Neighborhoods must balance the need to maintain housing opportunities for low-
income families with welcoming new families with more purchasing power to be successful.   
 
The strategic use of development projects to enhance an areas’ perception is nothing new and has 
proven effective in many circumstances (Green, 2002).  The purpose of this study, at least in part, 
is to determine if NeDA’s efforts are producing a positive output – inspiring reinvestment – or if 
they are fighting behaviors on the part of residents that run counter to their own efforts.  Equity 
stripping, both to greater and lesser degrees, has the potential to counteract the effects of NeDA 
development projects.  
 
 
Defining “Equity Stripping:” 
 
Equity Stripping is a set of behaviors on the part of property owners (often landlords from outside 
the area) causing the value of the property to decline while maintaining the income the owner 
receives.  These may include delayed repairs, minimal maintenance, rare upgrades as new 
technologies change how housing is used, and the use of home equity loans to harness the value 
of the property as property values increase.  Inadequate tenant screening to expedite the process 
of filling the unit and to minimize complaints about the deteriorating quality of the property can 
also be associated with equity stripping. 
 
The term is especially nebulous because so many of these behaviors are common, to a lesser 
degree, among property owners (whether they are homesteaders or investors) in general and 
because so many of them overlap with behaviors common among inexperienced or disinterested 
landlords and homeowners.  
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Another point worth noting is that such behaviors are sometimes advocated as an investment 
strategy – use of the accumulated wealth in a property to expand holdings and maximize earnings 
from rent is a way to protect private holdings and increase personal wealth.  While such a 
deliberate plan of questionably legal garnering of funds may be uncommon, there are still 
concerns associated with the more moderate manifestations of equity stripping.1
 
For the purposes of this study, we examined several different factors that would be indicators if 
owners were stripping equity from their properties.  These include the number of permits taken 
out and their value (investment), complaints (as an indicator of early stages of disinvestment), 
mortgages taken out, their value and status as primary or secondary loans, and the number of 
foreclosures.  
 
 
Methodology:  
 
The basic structure of this study was to compare an area that had been targeted by NeDA for 
investment (Core) with a comparable area that had received no such aid (Match).  In order to 
identify similar regions, we relied on census data.  The Core area was identified by NeDA staff 
based on experience and knowledge of the region, as was a rough idea of where the Match area 
would be located.  The demographic characteristics of individual census blocks of each area (nine 
in the Core area, 17 in the Match area) were collected.  Individual blocks were matched based on 
population, racial and ethnic composition, median age, total number of housing units, percent 
rental and percent of housing that was vacant.  Income was excluded, since the Core area had 
been selected for investment precisely because incomes in those census blocks had historically 
been lower than anywhere else in the West Side area.   
 
The second step was to collect parcel-level information that would be relevant to identifying 
equity stripping.  County records include 2006 property information like lot size, tax value, and 
property type.  City records, permits, complaints, and inspections information was collected from 
the previous two years.  This included number, value, and type, where relevant.  Finally, 
mortgages and foreclosures, as well as date of last sale, were retrieved from the county records 
system for each of the identified properties.   
 
 
Limitations: 
 
There is publicly available parcel-level data for the type of information needed to conduct this 
study.  More difficult is assembling it in a usable and fairly standardized manner.  Data must be 
retrieved from multiple sources within the city and the county information systems.  It’s 
organized using three distinct and not always compatible labeling systems: address, pin number, 
and legal description. The time frame varies, as well – the city licensing record system was put in 
place in 2002, but the actual dates of complaints or permits available varies. County records of 
mortgages (on-line) go back further, to 1990.  Both systems are opaque – both in their ease of 
                                                 
1 The following are examples of investment websites promoting a form of equity stripping: 
http://www.rjmintz.com/equity_stripping.html
http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=168729
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6803432/site/newsweek/
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/1222005_Stripping_Makes_It_To_The_Big_.asp
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interpretation and data access functions.  All of these features make comparing data between 
systems difficult, and we’ve attempted to avoid it in many cases.   
 
Additionally, the storage format of the data for mortgages was difficult to use, since they’re filed 
under their legal descriptions – a very difficult system to convert to either county pin numbers or 
addresses.   In the Match area in particular there were difficulties, so that information, as it relates 
to data found elsewhere, should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Furthermore, the limitations of data availability in terms of time and the fact that there’s no 
baseline data to compare current trends to makes it difficult to come to definite conclusions.  We 
have no way to determine if property values are increasing more or less rapidly, or if the number 
of complaints is decreasing.   
 
Another difficulty was our inability to physically inspect housing; it’s possible that a lack of 
permits taken out on a given property is less a result of property degeneration and more the result 
of the structure having been built better to begin with.  Based on the data alone, we can’t 
determine if a single property is an asset or a liability for the neighborhood’s well-being, so we 
have to rely on overall trends.  
 
 
Findings: 
 
Since NeDA targeted the Core area for development efforts because it was the most impoverished 
and deteriorating of neighborhoods on the West Side, finding perfectly comparable blocks outside 
the area was difficult.  There were therefore some differences in the basic features of housing in 
the two areas.  
 
First, property values were somewhat 
different.  Since this was not one of 
the variables used to match areas, it 
is expected.  Based on a straight 
measure of average property value, 
properties in the Core area are worth 
$14,000 less than those in the Match 
area (see Table 1).  To determine 
how much of the difference in the 
property values was due to location 
and how much to housing quality, we 
also examined the value of the parcel 
per square foot.  The Core property values were lower by an average of almost a dollar/square 
foot, or $5,732.50 for the average parcel.  The difference, then, can be attributed both to the 
quality of housing present and to the desirability of the location.  
Table 1: Basic Housing Description 
Core  Match  
Median Market Value  $167,900  $183,900 
Median Parcel Size (acres)  .14  .14 
Median Parcel Value ($/Sq ft)  $8.08  $9.02 
Median Structure Value  $116,800  $130,500 
Median Year of Construction  1894  1904.5 
Percent Homesteaded  76.1%  72.9% 
Median Term of Ownership  6 yrs 2 wks  6 yrs 
Median Equity Earned  $69,400  $65,500 
Data obtained from Ramsey County Public Records 
 
Perhaps more relevant were the differences in structure type, which has implications for the 
number of rental properties and the types of residents who can be attracted to the area.  In the 
Core area, 72% of properties were single family structures, while in the Match area 73% were 
single family.  The type of multi-family varied more greatly, with more 3-9 unit dwellings in the 
Core area and more duplexes and larger multi-family structures in the Match area, but the bulk of 
the housing types were similar.  The median year of construction for the Core area was about 10 
years earlier than for the Match area, though both areas had plenty of new construction occurring 
well into the 20th century.  Property sizes were also comparable.  
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Chart 1: Core ‐ Housing Type
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Chart 2: Match ‐ Housing Type
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Rental status was another important point.  There were more homesteaded properties in the Core 
area, but only by about 3%.  Given the size of the areas, that only amounts to a difference of 6 or 
7 properties.  In the Core area, 17.8% of properties were participating in the rental registration 
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program, while in the Match area 18.3% were.  For practical purposes, the two areas were 
comparable in terms of rental and homestead status. (See Charts 1 and 2).   
 
Term of ownership is another valuable measure in housing analysis; it tells us about the stability 
of the neighborhood and how tied residents are to their properties.  In this case, the median term 
of ownership for each of the areas differs by only 2 weeks, with Core residents being slightly 
more long-term.  More interesting is how much the value of properties has gone up in this amount 
of time; Core residents have seen their homes appreciate by almost $4,000 more than those in the 
Match area.  Without time series data available, investigating this further is not possible.  What it 
suggests is that, relative to the Match area, Core area property values are increasing more rapidly.  
Some of this could be attributed to the term of ownership; a wider distribution for term of 
ownership in the target area could result in the appearance of greater property value increases.   
 
 
Investment 
 
When measuring investment in an area, construction permits are the first place to look; though 
they’re thought to undercount the amount of permit-requiring labor done by 30% (Goetz, 1997), 
they’re still a useful measure of the extent to which the physical assets of the area are being 
improved.  
 
Since the beginning of 2000, the total value of completed permits in the Core area was $899,895, 
or $6,163.66 per property.  There was an average of 1.45 permits for each property.  In the Match 
area investment was somewhat higher, with $912,583.80 the total value of completed permits, 
and over $2,000 more per structure at $8,372.33 on each property.  The number of permits per 
property was also higher, at an average of 1.62.  
 
According to their records, the value of NeDA investment in the Core area amounts to $384,560.  
There were no NeDA projects in the Match area.  Since NeDA relied on contractors for 
conducting the work, and contractors obtain the permits, the total permit value is more than 
$200,000 less than that amount.  Most likely, this is because permit value is based on the value of 
the physical improvements, not the labor involved.  Furthermore, those were only on new 
construction projects; in those cases where NeDA aided a private owner in obtaining credit, 
permit values weren’t counted.  
 
Table 2: Permits by Area 
Core  Match  
Total Permit Value  $899,895.00  $912,583.80 
Average Permit Value/Property  $6163. 266  $8372.33 
Number of Permits  211  177 
Average Permits/Property  1.45  1.6 
 
The number of permits taken out also varied by year (See Chart 3).  While there has been a steady 
increase in number for the past 3 years in the Core area, the Match area has experienced the same 
trend, though to a lesser extent.  In both cases, 2006 saw the highest number of permits in the 
2000-2006 timeframe, but it’s unclear what this can be attributed to.  It’s possible that the rising 
home equity and increasingly common home equity loans has freed up more money to be 
invested in homes, or that rising market values throughout the Twin Cities have encouraged more 
people to build an addition rather than buy a larger home.   
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Chart 3: Number of Permits by Year
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The value of permits varied more annually; while the Match area may show a slight trend toward 
increasing values, the Core area doesn’t seem to show the same (See Chart 4).  In either case, the 
average is likely increased by the occasional large project, with general investment possibly 
remaining steady through time.  
Chart 4: Average Permit Value by Year
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Given the lower incomes in the Core area, it’s possible that these values or the number of permits 
may inaccurately count the amount of labor done in the area.  Since they have less available 
income, residents of the Core area may be more likely to do labor themselves or rely on the aid of 
friends and family.  If this results in a disproportionate amount of work being done without 
adequate permits in the Core area as compared to the Match area, then this analysis may be 
inaccurate.  
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Complaints 
 
The City of Saint Paul also tracks those complaints that require a visit from an inspector.  They 
range from complaints about un-mowed lawns to accumulated rubbish, but are all the sorts of 
exterior aesthetic considerations that often reflect the amount of effort people are willing or able 
to go to as residents and members of the community.  Complaints of this nature are important to 
include, since they capture the minor problems that would not require a permit to correct.  A high 
incidence of quality of life complaints can mean one of two things; substantial evidence of 
disinvestment, or that neighborhood residents are very concerned about garbage control issues.  
In many cases, these work in concert – residents of a neighborhood perceived to be in decline 
tend to be more concerned about aesthetic issues, while those confident in their neighborhoods 
may be either more willing to wait to see if it’s corrected or more likely to assume a neighbor will 
call in.   
 
For the years 2005-2006, the NeDA 
investment area (Core) had 46 complaints 
related to property maintenance issues, 
whereas the matched area had only 28.  Even 
when compared to the total number of 
properties in each region, the ratio is still .335 for the target area and .266 for the control group.  
(See Table 3).  Since data was only available for two years, there’s no way to know if the current 
rate of complaints in the focus area is a decline or an increase, and the relatively low number 
makes error possible.  Even so, the difference is striking.  These may, in part, be related to the 
foreclosure rate.  Often, properties that are for sale and unoccupied are allowed to slide, as far as 
trash service or lawn care goes.  When owned by a bank or managed by a realtor, properties are 
more likely to receive complaints.  As mentioned later in the report, the foreclosure rate in the 
Core area is startlingly higher than in the Match area, increasing the likelihood that there are gaps 
in property management causing complaints.  
Table 3: Complaints by Area 
Core  Match  
Number of Complaints  46  28 
Average Complaints/Property  .34  .27 
 
 
Population Stability 
 
Another important measure of the true value of the permits taken out and completed is the length 
of time the owner retains the property.  The popularity of property “flipping,” or the practice of 
making largely cosmetic changes to a property to inflate its value artificially (Focer, ?), is thought 
by some to be depriving buyers of equity in their homes by preventing the cost of known needed 
repairs from being included in the purchase price of the home.  This is a form of equity stripping 
in itself.  When a property is resold shortly after repairs are made, the likelihood that properties 
aren’t being improved in a substantial way is higher. 
 
To attempt to gauge the value of the improvements in this respect, both sales dates and Truth in 
Sale of Housing (TISH) inspection records were examined.  In the past 2 years, there were only 6 
inspections in the Core area – 4.1% of the total 146 properties.  For the Match area, these 
numbers were comparable, with 8 inspections, making up 7.3% of the 109 properties.  While both 
of these numbers are quite low, those properties being sold are no more likely to have had recent 
improvements than other properties.  The population appears to be relatively stable, with no rapid 
turnover resulting from owners trying to make a quick buck.  
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Mortgages 
 
As property values increase, either as a result of external economic factors or as a result of 
targeted development strategies, the wealth of the homeowners increases.  Secondary loans (those 
based on home equity and used for a vacation or remodeling, rather than the initial loan to 
purchase the home) are indicative of how the wealth of the neighborhood is being used.  If it’s 
used to improve the property it contributes to the development effort, whereas if it’s used to 
consolidate credit card debt or as a down payment on an investment property in another area, the 
wealth generated by neighborhood improvements is leaving the area and being lost to everyone 
but the owners of the individual home.   
 
Since mortgages aren’t recorded as either a home equity loan or a home purchase loan, this 
information was estimated by comparing the date of last sale of the property to the date of the 
loan and counting any loans taken out within two months of the purchase date as primary loans.  
Since mortgage data was only available for the past five years, a substantial number of properties 
appear to have no loans taken out on them, even though their owners do have current mortgages 
and are in the process of paying them off.  In the Core NeDA investment area, 47 (or 
approximately 1/3rd of the total 146) properties had no loans on record.  Of the remaining 98 
properties, 4 were indeterminable, 18 were home purchase loans, and 76 were secondary loans.  
Only 23% of all loans were for the purchase of the home.  In the control or “Match” area, there 
were no records of mortgages on 29 of the 109 (or 27%) properties.  15% (12) of the loans were 
for the purchase of the home.  
 
The value of the loans is also significant; on average, the value of secondary loans was 68% of 
the home’s 2006 estimated value in the NeDA focus area.  Given that 65% of homes in the area 
were purchased before the year 2000 and given the recent rapid inflation in home values, it’s not 
altogether surprising that owners have substantial equity in their homes.  The county records only 
go back as far as 1990 in records of home sales, but the median increase in property value for 
properties purchased since then is $69,400.  In the control area, 68% of properties were last sold 
before 2000, and the median increase in property value has been $65,500.   
 
Since home equity loans are a way to use the equity in a home, this type of loan is important as a 
way of making assets more liquid.  To discover how much of the value of those assets was being 
used locally, we compared loan values to permit values. 
 
While there were relatively few rental properties where owners took out loans after the time of 
purchase (14), the value of these loans ranged from $20,000 to $331,500.  The majority of these 
(11) had no completed permits since the loan.  In contrast, owner-homesteaded property owners 
had taken out loans ranging from $5000 to $264,000 and only roughly a third (23 of 62) had not 
reinvested in their homes.  If we look only at homesteaded duplexes (8), since one unit is likely 
rented, only 2 property owners did not reinvest in the home.   
 
By contrast, in the Match area only about a third of rental property owners had not reinvested in 
their properties.  However, given the higher number of multi-family apartment complexes, that 
may be misleading.  Sixty percent of owner-occupied properties had a home equity mortgage but 
made no improvements to their properties.  This may be explained by either superior quality 
housing (though the age of the structures is roughly comparable in each region), or by the greater 
availability of low-cost financing provided by NeDA.   
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Table 4: Value of Reinvestment by Region and Housing Type 
Core   Match   
   Num  Avg Equity Loan 
Val 
Avg Permit 
Val 
Num  Avg Equity Loan 
Val 
Avg Permit Val 
Rental  14  $151,136.10  $1257.00  16  $177,330.20  $23,834.42* 
Homestead  62  $98,290.16  $7340.60  52  $117,211.00  $4239.66 
Single Family  52  $93,841.96  $7892.40  45  $120,929.70  $4613.25 
Duplex  8  $126,541.80  $2292.86  4  $65,533.75  $2250.00 
*several large apartment complexes exist in this area 
 
 
In the NeDA target area, the majority of loans were not totally reinvested, but most completed 
some work.   The average was 10.45% going toward permits, with a high of more than 100%, 
suggesting that the owners had other sources of funding for their improvements.  In the matched 
area there were also few owners who used their loans exclusively for improvements, but the 
average rate of reinvestment was 12.45% and the high was also over 100%.  When these numbers 
are broken down by structure type, it becomes apparent that the average rate of reinvestment 
overall is misleading.  The large apartment complexes in the Match area that received significant 
improvements artificially inflate the average. Excluding rental properties from the overall 
calculations yields a much more favorable rate of investment for the Core area; the average 
amount of permitted investment for each type of structure substantially exceeded that of the 
Match area, despite lower loan values (see Table 4).  While this could be due in part to a housing 
stock in greater need of repair, it does indicate that positive changes are being made in the area.  
 
Foreclosures are also significant indicators of neighborhood health. There were 22 foreclosures in 
the past decade in the NeDA focus area, or roughly 15% of properties.  The average value of 
these loans was $110,910.  Three-quarters of the foreclosed loans were secondary mortgages.  
The difference between the Core group and the Match group is striking; in the Match area, only 2 
properties (of 109) had been foreclosed upon.  One was a secondary loan and the other was taken 
out at the time of purchase of the home, and both were well over $100,000 in value.  
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
The Core area’s historic and continuing lack of economic prosperity is highly relevant to how 
property is maintained, used, and improved.  Where property values and incomes are lower, 
investment can’t match higher income regions and when there is wealth in the form of home 
equity, there are many things beyond home improvements that it can be diverted to.  The 
difference between the financial states of residents of the two areas is highlighted by the number 
of foreclosures; when the economy slows, it’s those whose footing is most precarious who 
stumble first.  Many more people stumbled in the Core area than the Match.  
 
The fundamental question, though, is if NeDA’s efforts have had a positive effect, or if they’ve 
been absorbed by investor-owners and redirected outside the area.  While there were many 
limitations to this study, there are a few points that can be made strongly.   
 
First, the presence of financing and grant money for low-income residents and the positive effects 
of NeDA’s development projects have not sparked a race to pull equity out of homes or 
speculatively purchase properties.  While there are substantial numbers of home equity loans on 
properties in the area, they don’t occur in significantly greater frequency than the Match area.   
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Second, significant investment is occurring in the Core area.  Whether this can be attributed to 
NeDA’s efforts is open to speculation, but even though the values of home equity loans in the 
area were significantly lower than those in the neighboring Match census blocks, recorded 
permits reflected higher values and much higher percentages of the whole.  This may be because 
properties were in a higher state of disrepair, as would be the case if owners who had been 
struggling for years finally faced something that required a loan, and therefore fixed several 
problems.  It could also be that, with smaller amounts available to them, owners in the Core area 
prioritized their use of financing differently.  
 
Third, while the area targeted for NeDA investment has experienced some changes for the better, 
it is by no means out of danger.  The number of foreclosures, complaints, and continuing lower 
property values, with corresponding characteristics clearly indicates that the neighborhood has 
not yet arrived as secure and stable.  
 
Undoubtedly there are landlords milking decaying properties for rent and as collateral for other 
investments, but NeDA activities have not caused them to flock in and prey on local residents. 
Property values have increased, but the source of that increase (beyond the larger economic 
environment) is undetermined.  The quality of homes is difficult to establish and the framework 
of this study did not allow us to pursue it. 
 
 
Directions for further research: 
 
The City of Saint Paul is in the process of implementing a fairly significant change in their policy 
toward rental housing, particularly in single-family residences and duplexes.  These changes are 
likely to have substantial effects on the state of housing and maintenance, as well as standardizing 
the quality of rental housing.  The data collected in this study could be used as a baseline to 
measure the effects of these changes.   
 
Additionally, the scope of the study could be expanded to include a broader range of times, a 
comparison to low-income areas elsewhere in the city, and better measures of property quality 
and maintenance.  All of these factors would contribute substantially to gauging the differences in 
property ownership and management strategies in the city.   
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